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Prologue

0

n the gray, chilly morning ofNowmher 12, 1921, Charles Evans

Hughe~, the fifty-nine-year-old US. Secretary of State, prepmed tu address delegates to the first intern:1tion:ll disarmament
conference in more than a decade. Hughes hoped th:1t the venue fur the

Washington Conference, C:ontinentall-bll, the quietly dignitJed building
dedicated to the heroes of the American Revolution, offered more than a
cosmetic contrast to the ornate French Foreign Ministry, the scene uf the
Peace Conference held in P:1ris less than three years earlier. If the disarmament umference proceeded as Hughes planned, discussions would rise
above the stubborn, selfish negotiations of the Paris conference. lie also
expected participants to move beyond the grand platitudes of earlier disarmament conferences. Having insisted that the United States host the
conference, he intended to pressure delegates representing the major naval
powers (Cireat Britain, Japan, and the United State~) tu produce positive,
tangible results that had eluded the world's best statesmen for two decades.
The distinguished Secretary of State, his full, white hemd immaculately gromned, sat in the center scat uf a lmge U-shapcd table. He was
flanked, on his right, by the U.S. delegation, which he had handpicked to
project bipartisanship. It included Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman ofthc Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and Oscar Underwood,
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the Democratic leader of the Senate, as well as Elihu Root, the respected
former U.S. senator and Secretary of State. On Hughes's left sat Arthur
James Balfour, the chief of the British delegation. Prince Tokugawa, descendant of the first ruling Shogun, represented Japan's royal family, hut
Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, the shrewd minister of the navy, was his
country's chief negotiator. Premier Aristide Briand of France also sat at the
table, as did government leaders from 1taly, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Portugal.
The delegations were surrounded hy three hundred journalists, including the veteran foreign correspondent Henry Nevinson of the Manchester
Ciuardian, editors of The Times of London and the Shanghai ~hun Pao, and
the midwestern sage William Allen White of the Emf)()ria [Kansas] (]azettc. The author H.(}. Wells carried press credentials, as did William Jennings Bryan, the three-time Democratic presidential candidate and former
Secretary of State. The gallery was filled with dignitaries: Vice President
Calvin Coolidge, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, Associate Justices
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Mrs. Warren G. Harding,
the president's wife, and Alice Longworth, Theodore Roosevelt's daughter.
Balfour initiated the formal proceedings by making the motion,
unanimously approved by the delegates, that Hughes serve as permanent
chairman of the conference. The Secretary of State then rose, briefly acknowledged the applause, and began his speech. He recounted the disappointing history of earlier disarmament conferences, dating hack to the
1R98 conference convened hy Tsar Nicholas 11 of Russia at The Hague. At
the outset, Hughes's manner was stiff and impersonal, reminding reporters
who had covered his losing campaign as the Republican Party's pre,idential
candidate in 1916 of his tendency to he thorough and excruciatingly dull.
But when Hughes introduced his disarmament proposal, his voice suddenly rose to a dramatic, commanding pitch. "Competition-in armamentmust stop," he said emphatically. Actions, not words, were needed to end
the competition, he declared, and promised that the United States would
take the lead. On behalf of the U.S. government, he said, he was authorized to scrap all American warships under construction, including six
battle cruisers and seven battleships (costing more than $330 million), as
well as fifteen existing battleships. The total number of capital ships to he
eliminated comprised an aggregate weight of R45, 740 tons. No nation had
ever made such an offer to reduce its armaments. Hughes paused to let the
delegates absorb his stunning statement.

When the excited whispering throughout the conference h~dl subsided, Hughes turned his :mention ro the British :md Japanese delegations,
demanding that their nations make comparable s:~crifices. For (}rear Britain, he said, it meant hal ring construction on four enormous "Hoods," the
Royal Navy's giant new warships, as well :ts rhe destruction of nineteen
other battleships The British scrap he:tp, he :tddcd, must include l-IMS

Kirv; George V, rhe battleship viewed most reverentially hy His M:qesty's
Royal Navy. While Balf\1ur scrihhlcd notes on :m envelope, an astonished
Lord Beatty, ( 1reat Brit;tin's First Sea Lord, hunched forward in his chair
and cast a mcn:tcin.~ look :tt the Secretary of Sr:m:. Huglws h:td sunk more
Rritish warships th:m ":til the :tdmirals ofthc world had destruycd in a cycle
uf centuries," the ( ;uanlicm's Nevinsun Lttcr wrote.
Hughes manhandled the );tp:tm·se fleet with equ:d tl.·rv(1r. B:tron
Kato, who lwd appeared supremely pleased when Hughes de\·astated rhc
American and British naval :trsen~ds, w:ts chagrined to hear what rhe
Secretary of St:tte had in mind for his n:tvy. Hughes insisted thar plans
for eight ]ap:mese warships he ahandoned, an addition:d sew·n h:tttlcships
and cruisers under construcri(l!1 he scrapped, ami rhat ten okk·r ships he
destroyed. The toll included the giant Mwsu, the pride of the J:tp:mcse
Empire.
"With the :tccepr:mce uf this pLm," Hughes conclttded, "the hurden of meeting the dem:mds of competition in naval arm:lllll'Ilt will he
lifted." As a result, "klnornHHIS sums will he released to ;tid the progress of
civilization."
Hughes's idealism w:ts tempered with ;t healthy dose of pr:i.~!ll;tt isn1.
He well knew that his formula to reduce the world's mmt puwerful n:tvies would meet with stiff resistance from Ure:ll Brit<1in and Jap;m. Fur
the next two and half months, Hughes prc.ssured and cajoled hi.s British
and Japanese counterparts in puhlic meetings and behind closed do,ns. llc
did not win every argument. Jap;m refused to destroy rhe Mutsu, t~ll·cing
Hughes to adjust the requirements fnr the United States and c;re:tt Rritain
to maintain :t rough tonnage ratio :mwng the three great powers. In early
Febru;try 1922, Hughes :tnJ1llunced the agrLTI!ll'nt between the three m:tjur
naval superpowers to dr;t'itictlly rcduCL' their fleets. The intcrnation:tl :tccord was hailed as an historic :tehie\'emenr, and Hughes emerged :ts one of
the world's leading statesmen.

*
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While Hughes received accolades for his disarmament conference triumph, Franklin D. Roosevelt was being fitted with 14-pound braces that
extended from his heels to above his waist. The braces were the latest and
harshest acknowledgment that Roosevelt had infantile paralysis and might
never walk again. Only a year earlier, Roosevelt seemed destined for high
puhlic office, perhaps the presidency. He was a descendant of one of the
nation's most illustrious political families. His distant cousin, Theodore
Roosevelt, had risen in the Republican Party to become president. Though
Franklin's side of the family were Democrats, he had consciously patterned
his political career on his cousin. Like Teddy, he had served as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy and campaigned as his party's vice-presidential candidate. Though the Democrats' 1920 presidential ticket of Ohio governor
James Cox and Roosevelt was trounced in the election, Franklin's political
prospects remained bright. There was immediately talk that the handsome,
athletic thirty-nine-year-old New Yorker might well head his party's national ticket in 1924 or 1928.
Roosevelt's high ambitions appeared to be irredeemably shattered on
August 10, 1921. That was the day he went to bed with severe chills after a
vigorous schedule of boating and swimming with his children near the family's summer estate on Campobello, a small island off the coast of Maine.
He thought he had a bad cold, a diagnosis mistakenly confirmed by the
local family doctor. Two days later, he had lost the ability to move his legs.
Dr. Robert Lovett, a faculty member at the Harvard Medical School and
the nation's leading expert on infantile paralysis, was summoned to Campobello. After Lovett examined Roosevelt, who was paralyzed from the
waist down, he was certain that his patient had contracted poliomyelitis.
In September, Roosevelt was transported to New York by private railroad car. The New York Times's front-page story informed the public, for
the first time, that the Democratic Party's rising star had polio and was
tu he treated at New York's Presbyterian Hospital hy Dr. George Draper,
Dr. Lovett's protege. At first, Draper assured reporters that Roosevelt would
walk again. Rut when his patient made no significant progress in the hospital, Draper hegan to doubt his early prognosis. He worried, moreover, that
the extent of Roosevelt's debilitating disease might destroy the patient's
psychological health as well as his hody.
Only Roosevelt himself possessed absolute confidence that he would
fully recover. Ry October, when he was discharged from the hospital to
return to the family's town house on East 65th Street, he could pull him-
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self up by a strap and, with assistance, swing himself into a wheelchair. A
trained physiotherapist, Mrs. Kathleen Lake, came to the house three days
a week, laid Roosevelt out on a stiff hoard, and stretched his legs. Franklin
demanded that she administer the painful exercises every day. Throughout
his ordeal, Roosevelt maintained his usual ebullience, gaily greeting family
member and friend alike, often cheering them up.
A raging battle, meanwhile, was being fought in the family town
house. Franklin's mother, Sara, had written off any future political career
for her son and made plans for him to retire to Hyde Park, where she could
lovingly care for him, as she had done for her elderly husband, James, before his death. But the imperious Sara faced a formidable challenge from
Franklin's wife, Eleanor, and his wily and indef~1tigahle political adviser,
Louis Howe, who had moved into the house to plot Roosevelt's political
comeback. They aggressively challenged every subtle maneuver by Sara
to bring Franklin permanently home to Hyde Park. Eleanor supervised
Franklin's physical recovery, while Howe worked laboriously to preserve
Roosevelt's political future, sending out a steady stream of press releases
and maintaining close contact with Democratic leaders across the country.
Though Roosevelt remained paralyzed from the waist down, Howe continued to believe that he would be elected president of the United States.

Charles Evans Hughes's ascent to the nation's highest judicial office was
predictable, if not preordained. No one was better equipped by training
and experience to be Chief Justice of the United States. He had been a
brilliant lawyer, a fearless investigator of corruption in the utilities and insurance industries, a progressive Republican governor of New York, and a
former associate justice of the Supreme Court. In his extraordinary career,
he had succeeded in almost every challenge he faced. The one exception:
he narrowly lost the presidency to Woodmw Wilson in 1916. After his successful four-year term as Secretary of State, highlighted by the Washington
Disarmament Conference, he returned to his lucrative private law practice
in New York City and was elected president of the American Bar Association. He also remained active in the Republican Party, campaigning vigorously for Herbert Hoover in 1928 in his successful presidential campaign.
After Chief Justice Taft died in the winter of 1930, Hoover nominated
Hughes to be the nation's eleventh Chief Justice.
Roosevelt's paralysis discouraged virtually any serious thought of fu-
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turc elective office outside of the family's home on East 65th Strl'eL But
by 1924, Roosevelt had mastered thl' usc of his heavy braces and prepared
to resume his political career. At the l )emocratic National Convention
in Madison Squ:1rc Uarden, he moved slowly toward to the podium, leaning heavily on the arm of his strapping sixteen-year-old son James. At the
podium, RoosevL'It, though perspiring profusely from his exertion, beamed
at the wildly applauding delegates, and delivered a rousing nominating
speech for New York governor AI Smith. In confident, dulcet tones, he
pr:1iscd Smith as the "'Happy Warrior' on the political battlefield." The
delegates eruptl'd in thunderous applause, a stirring tribute to Roosevelt
as much as to the man he had nominated. Four years later, Roosevelt was
elected governor of New York, and, in 19)0, he was reelected by a landslide. Howe's political timetable c1lled for Ruosevelt to run for the presidency in 19)6, after Hoover had completed what Howe presumed would
he his second term. But Hoover's ineffectual response to the nreat Depression destroyed his presidency and accelerated Howe's schedule. In November 1932, Roosevelt was elected presidl'nt, heating Hoover in the electoral
college, 472-59.

Shmtly hefore his presidential inauguration on March 4, 19) 3, Roosevelt
wrote a cordi:d note to Hughes, recalling their long friendship and expressing his admir<ltion and respect for the Chief Justice. He asked if he
might break tradition and recite the entire presidential oath. Hughes readily agreed and wrote that he "especially prized the opportunity of being
associated with you in our great American enterprise."
ln his inaugural address, Roosevelt promised "direct, vigorous action"
to lift the nation out of the disastwus economic depression. Immediately
upon taking office, he transformed hts pledge of "a new deal fur the American people" into a fusillade of legislative proposals to the Democratically
controlled Congress. Congress responded hy passing laws that shut down
insolvent hanks, regulated stock sales, imposed industrial codes, subsidized
farmers, and put more than a quarter million unemployed young men to
wmk in the Civilian Conservation C:urps.
In official Washington, only the U.S. Supreme Court appeared immune to FDR\ contagious spirit. The Hughes Court was anchored by four
ideological conservatives intractably opposed to Roosevelt's New Deal.
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The Court's liberal wing was led hy Justice Louis Brandeis, supported hy
Associate Justices Benjamin Cardozo and Harlan Fiske Stone.
Chief Justice Hughes and his fellow Hoover appointee, Associate
Justice Owen Roherts, hdd the balance of judicial power throughuut the
critical constitutional battles over New De<d legisbtion. By force of his
commanding intellect and exempbry public service, Hughes was expected
to lead the Court. But in which direction? He sometimes appeared to split
the difference between the two warring factions, writing eloquent majority
opinions protecting civil liberties hut frequently joining the Court's conservatives in striking down New Deal statutes.
Roosevelt publicly derided the Court's anti-New Deal decisions as
rdics of a bygone "horse-and-buggy" era. His criticism did nothing to deter
a Court majority that continued to declare one New Deal statute after
another unconstitutional. Not even his triumphant Llndslide re-election
appeared to influence the justices. Finally, in frustration and anger in early
19)7, the president proposed a so-called rcfmm plan that would allow him
to appoint one new justice f(Jr every sitting justice seventy years of age or
older. Because six justices were over seventy, including Hughes, the plan
would have permitted FDR to stack the Court with new appointees favorahle to the New Deal. His radical proposal raised two unsettling constitutional questions: Should a president he <Jbk to mold a Court to meet
his political goals? And should ideologically driven justices be allowed to
frustrate the public will? Both questions arc as relevant in the twenty-hrst
century as they were during the C)rcat Depression.
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan crcared a dramatic confrontation hetween the President and Chief Justice. Roosevelt promoted his plan as
an effort to bring new energy to an overworked and aging Court. But he
did a poor joh in disguising his true purpose: to undermine the power uf
life-tenured justices to thwart his popular mandate. Hughes proved more
than a match for Rousevelt in defending rhe Court. He deftly rebutted the
president's claim that the justices were incapable of keeping abreast of the
Court calendar, and the proposal was resoundingly defeated. In grudging
admiration of Hughes, Roosevelt later said that the Chief Justice was the
best politician in the country. That was hardly the way Hughes would have
chosen to be remembered, though there was much truth in the president's
remark.
Shortly after the defeat of his Court-packing plan, Roosevelt made
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the first of five appointments to the Court in less than three years. All of
the new justices, from former Senator Hugo Black to Roosevelt's Attorney
CJeneral, Frank Murphy, were Democrats and loyal New Dealers. Rut with
each new Roosevelt appointee, Chief Justice Hughes seemed more assured
in leading the Court. Administration insiders expected the president's third
appointee, Harvard Law professor Felix Frankfurter, a Roosevelt confidant
and scathing critic of the Court's anti-New Deal decisions, to challenge
Hughes for the Court's intellectual leadership. Rut Frankfurter quickly deferred to Hughes and became one of his most avid admirers, ranking him as
one of the nation's great chief justices.
Roosevelt was slow to recover from the Court-packing debacle. Emboldened conservative Democrats and Republicans blocked the liberal
president's legislative agenda. Midway through his second term, Roosevelt
appeared to he a weak, lame-duck president. Rut he never lost his confidence and, like Hughes, never ceded leadership. He outmaneuvered isolationists senators, many of whum had opposed his Court-packing pLm, to
expedite essential aid to Ureat Britain as the Allies hovered on the brink
of defeat at the start of the Second World War.
When Hughes announced his retirement from the Court in June 1941,
Roosevelt issued a heartfelt letter of regret and invited the Chief Justice
to lunch at the White House. They talked alone, sharing for the last time
their common bond of national leadership at a critical point in American
history.

